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Introduction
The scenado is familiar: The
insured, present in counsel's office,
has suffered a loss involving home,
auto or business and has made a
claim for insurance. The insured
reports being shocked when the in-
surer said the loss was flot covered
because of a condition or exclusion
or existing coverage was reduced by
an offset of limitation of liabiJity
clause. Usually, counsel is also sur-
prised by the policy language that
defeats or reduces coverage or by the
way the insurer applies the policy
language to defeat coverage.
However, the insured's belief that
the policy covered the loss seems
reasonable, and the result appears
unfair. Counsel invariably wonders
whethet the offending insurance
policy provision can be deemed void
in Montana for violating the reason-
able expectations of the insured.
After all, the court has protected the
rights of insureds by finding viola-
tions of the insured's reasonable
expectations in such notev/orthy
cases as Horú u. Progressiue Sþecialtl
Ins. Co.,2 (2003) and Benr¿ett u. State
Farm Møtual,3 (1993).
Then there is the famous line by
Professor l(eeton, oft quoted by the
Montana Supreme Coutt,a "The ob-
fectiveþ reasonable expectations of
appLicants and intended beneficiaries
regarding the terms of insurance
contracts will be honored even
though painstaking study of the
policy provisions would have negated
those expectations." It would be a
gleaming sword indeed that would
slay an insurance ptovision soleþ for
violating an insured's reasonable
expectations.
\)Øhile the reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine in Montana varies
depending on the court you are in, it
is alive, well, and under-appreciated.
The courts are not clear on its theo-
retical basis, but use it libetally to
damn or bless insurance provisions.
Our inquiry here raises sevetal
questions, the biggest being, can we
in fact, void an insurance provision in
Montana solely because it violates the
insured's reasonable expectations?
Can the reasonable expectations doc-
trine be applied absent any fìnding
of ambiguity? Or, if the provision
violates the insuted's reasonable
expectations, is there automaticaþ
ambiguity? Can the insured have a
teasonable expectation in varnnce
with the policy provisions where
there is no ambiguity?
Montana State and Federal
Courts have cited reasonable expecta-
tions of the insured in perhaps
twenty decisions. ,4. review of those
decisions reveals that the doctrine is
frequently invoked by counsel for
insurance consumers and is readily
applied by state and federal coufts
either to void a provision altogether
or to resolve an ambiguity in a poJicy.
Nevertheless, reasonable expectations
decisions in Montana reflect a lack of
clartty about the doctrine resulting in
conflicting couft pronouncemefits.
Counsel who can advocate for clear
application of the doctrine have a
fìne tool for assuring that their clients
get the benefìt of the poJicy for
which they bargained.
Professor Keeton's Concept of
Reasonable Expectations
Historically, insureds played a
substantial role in formulating their
insurance policies. In the coffee
houses in London where the ship-
oq/ners negotiated insurance with
the underv¡riters, the terms weÍe
subiect to a certajtn amount of bar-
gaining. Âs insurance spread to pro-
tection of property from fte and to
injury and damage atising out of
business, auto travel, and aviation, the
use of forms drafted by the insurers
or their ttade organizattons became
the convention. Today, only the most
sophisticated commercial insureds
and thek brokers are engaged in
negotiating an¡,thing other than price
and levels of coverage. The contracts
have become contracts of adhesion
which the insured can either accept
or reject
in total.
r\s contracts of adhesion, insur-
ance policies were subject to the
general contract rule that ambiguity
is resolved against the draftsmen.
However, I(eeton, in studying tights_
in variance from the insurance policy
provisions, noticed the development
of a line of decisions in which
courts voided unambiguous provi-
sions in favor of the insured based
solely on reasonable expectalions.
Hence, his famous assertion that the
objectively reasonable expectations
of the insured regarding the terms of
the policy "will be honored even
though painstaking study of the
policy ptovisions would have negated
those expectations."s l(eeton further
said:6
Not only should a
policyholder's reasonable ex-
pectations be honored in the
face of diffìcult and technical
langtage, but those expecta-
I
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tions should prevail as well
when the language of an
unusual provision is clearþ
understandable, unless the
insuret can show that the
policyholder's failure to read
such language is unreasonable.
More specifìcally, and consistent
with the Montana court decisions,
I(eeton said, '1\n insurer will not be
permitted an unconscionable advan-
tage in an insurance transaction, and
the reasonable expectations of appJi-
cants and intended beneficiades will
be honored."T For l(eeton, the reason-
able expectations doctrine is based in
unconscionabilty. Courts used ambi-
guity mereþ as a means to teach rea-
sonable expectations, and the maiority
of decisions {ìnding ambiguity needed
reasonable expectations as a ground
for the ambiguity. 
'{. necessary result
of basing reasonable expectations in
unconscionabiJity is that courts would
differentiate between sophisticated
and unsophisticated insureds, limiting
recovery fot insureds such as lawyers
and big business.
Whì1e the Montana courts have
regularþ appJied the doctrine of rea-
sonable expectations, the decisions
have been inconsistent. However,
analysis of the Montana cases and
the reasoning of the state ând federal
courts,' allows us to categoine the
cases into roughly three lines: (1) those
cases arguably establishing that the
"reasonable expectations" doctrine is a
stand-alone doctrine based on uncon-
scionabiìiry thus not tequiring a con-
tract law fìnding of ambiguity to
trigger its application; (2) those cases
that apply the "reasonable expecta-
tions" doctfine as arì adjunct to con-
tract la'w, thus requiring an ambiguity
in the contract language before looking
to the reasonable expectations of the
insured; and (3) those cases in which
there is no ambiguiry but the court
appears to apply the doctrine and
concludes that the insured's expecta-
tions are not reâsonable because a clear
exclusion from coverage defeats them.
Classic Keeton: Voiding an insur-
ance provision absent ambiguity
solely for violating the insureds
teasonable expectations
The Montana Supreme Court has
ruled insurance clauses void for vio-
lating an insured's reasonable expec-
tations. Transamericø In¡. Co. u. Rojt/e,
(1983)8 appears to be the frst Mon-
tana" càse to apply the doctrine of
reasonable expectations, argaal:iry
adopting I(eeton's princþles verba-
ttm. Ro/e involved a child âuto pas-
senger who sued her mother for
quadrþlegic injuries she suffered as
a result of the mother's negligence
whjle driving the family auto.
Transameric a.'s avto poJicy included
a "household exclusion" which ex-
cluded coverage "for bodily injury to
âny person who is related by blood,
maringe, or adoption to fthe in-
sured], if that person resides in fthe
insuredb] household at the time of
the loss." The Federal District Court
certified to the Montana Supreme
Coutt the following questions: (1)
whether the "household exclusion"
was valid, and Q) whether a parent was
immune from tort liability to a child.
First, the Montana Supreme
Court held that, by enacting the Man-
datory Insutance Law, MCA S 33-6-
301., "the legislatute has expressly
outlawed the'household exclusion."
Therefore, the inclusion of the clause
violated Montana public policy by
violating a statutory provision. Sec-
ond, the court abrogated parental
immunity by holding that a parent is
not immune from a chld's tort action
arising from injury by automobile.
The court continued, "In addition,
we hold that the household exclusion
clause is invalid due to its failure to
'honot the reasonable expectations'
of the purchaser of the policy." The
coutt cited l(eeton's famous article
and quoted l(eeton's principle.e The
court ended by saying, "This policy
is an adhesion contract that justi{ìes
this coutt's consideration of the
consumer apptoach,"1o
The court found no ambiguity
in Ro/e, the household exclusion
there being quite clear. Hence, Rolle
was the classic I(eeton principle case
that voided an unambiguous insur-
ance provision for violating the
insured's reasonable expectations.
Doubters can only speculate whether
the coutt would have ruled the exclu-
sion invalid for violating reasonable
expectations if the exclusion had not
also been found to be "expressly
outlawed" by the Mandatory Insur-
ance Law:
In 1990, the Montana Supreme
Court cited Ro/e in finding that a
"limit of liabilty" clause in State
Farm's policy's definition of
"undetsinsufed vehicle" violated
the insured's teasonable expectations.
In Sun Farm Mwt Auto. Ins. Co. u.
Braøn,11 a Montana resident insured
for UIM with State Farm was killed
while riding in an auto operated and
insured in Canada. The Canadian
policy had BI limits of 200,000, ttut
Canadtàn tort law limited recovery
for death damages to funetal ex-
penses only. The State Farm policy
promised to pay damages the insured
was "legally entitled to collect" from
an underinsured motorist and defined
an underinsured vehicle as one whose
limit of liabiJity for bodily injury
liabiJity was less than the victim's tort
damages. The policy required that
limit to be "used up by payment of
judgments or setdement" befote any
UIM benefìts would be payable. Con-
sequently, State Farm refused any
UIM demand on the ground that
Braun was not entitled to collect
mofe than funeral expense under
Canadtan tott law so that the limit of
BI liabiJity would never be used.¡rp.
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The court ìn Montana held that
"legally entitled to collect" in UIM
referred only to establishment of
fault and not damages, and that, after
the fault threshold was met, UIM
coverage was governed by contract
law as opposed to tort law. The court
then resolved the case by concluding
that the "limit of JiabiJity" language
violated the reasonable expectatìons
of the insured. The coutt said, "The
insured could reasonably expect to
recover the difference between v¡hat
he could collect from the tortfeasor's
policy and his proven damages up to
the poìicy limits purchased." The
court did not fìnd ambþity, and the
case appears to illustrate the l(eeton
approach. Ironically, the attorney
arguing against reasonable expecta-
tions for State Farm 'tn Braun was
Lyman Bennett who had a reasonable
expectations spiritual awakening in
the next case in which the doctrine
arose in the Montana Supteme Coutt.
Bennett u. State Farm Møt. Aato.
Tns. Co.t2 decided by the court in
1993, buttressed Ro/e and Braøn.
There, State Farm issued two auto
insurance policies with $100,000
Underinsured Motorist coverage
limits to Bozeman àttorney,Lyman
Bennett and his wife Bonnie. Bonnie
was struck and injured as a pedestrian
by an underinsured motorist and
sought to recover the limits of both
policies since she was an insured under
each policy. State Farm refused to p^y
both limits on the basis of an "other
insurance" clause limiting coverage to
the highest ümit of coverage where
there are multiple policies.
Bennett was originally removed to
federal court where Judge Hatfìeld
found the "other insurance" clause
ambþous and then found that void-
ing the clause comported with the
insured's reasonable expectations.l3
That decision was appealed to the
Ninth Circuit, which certified to the
Montana Supreme Court the question
whether an "other insurance" clause
that prohibits stacking of under-
insured motorist coverage provided
by separate policies from the same
insurer is void as against public
policy?
The Montana Supreme Court
rejected State Farm's argument that
because the Bennetts had only paid
for $100,000 UIM coverage under
each of their policies and not
$200,000, they could not teasonably
expect dual coverage under the un-
ambþous "other insurance" clause
appearing in both policies. The court
reasoned that, by "the cleat and un-
ambþous language of State Fatm's
insurance policy," the UIM coverage
was personal to the insured and not
dependent on the insured occupying
an insured vehicle. Hence, Bennett
could reasonably expect coverage up
to the limits of both policies for
which she was an insured and for
which separate premiums had been
paid.
In holding the "other insurance"
clause that prohibits stacking of the
UIM coverage void as against public
poJicy, the court summarily said:
In Transamerica u. Ro/e (1983),
202Mont. 1.73, 656 P.zd 820,
we invalidated a "household
exclusion" clause in an auto-
mobile liabiJity policy because
it did not honor the reasonable
expectations of the insured.
lØe reaffìrmed that decision in
IVelhorzte u. Hone In¡ørance Ca
(1,993), 257 Mont. 354, 358,
849 P.2d 1.90,1.93, stating that
the "reasonable expectation
doctrine is in accord with our
strong public policy that insur-
ance is intended to serve a
fundamental protective pur-
pose. rü7e affium it again here.
The Bennett court asserted that
the promise to pay UIM benefìts was
clear and unambþous. On its face,
Bennelt still suppotts the argument
that an insurance provision can be
invalidated solely for failing to honor
the reasonable expectations of the
insuted. The Bennelt court did not say
ambiguity was tequired, not did it
fìnd any ambiguity in the policies at
issue.
In the 1995 companion cases of
L¿ibrand u. Nationøl Farmers Unioru
Propory and Casaalry Co., and Cole u.
Track Insurance Exchange,la Federal
District Judge Shanstrom, certified to
the Montana Supreme Court the
question whether amendatory en-
dotsements containing modifìed
household exclusions to auto cover-
age \Ã/ere valid and enforceable in
Montana. The insureds in each case
took the positions that the exclusions
were void and unenforceable for
1) being unclear and ambþous,
(2) violating their teasonable expecta.
tions, and (3) violating the public
policy of Montana. The Montana
Supreme Court concluded that the
policy provisions at issue were un-
clear, ambþous, and void. ,\ccord-
ingly, the court declined tô reach the
issues of whether the provisions
violated the insured's reasonable
expectations, or wefe void as contfary
to public policy.
Only if the coutt considered
reasonable expectations to be a sepa-
rate ground for invalidating the modi-
fìed exclusion did the holding in
I ¿ibrand make serìse. If the court
considered reasonable expectâtions
only applicable to resolve ambþity,
there was no reason it could not
apply the doctrine to resolve the
ambiguity. In effect, the court said
that the provision was ambiguous so
as to be unenforceable, making a
fìnding of invalidity for violation of
reasonable expectations moot. There-
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fore, going to the trouble of detailing
a separate anaþsis would aPPe r
unnecessafy.
lnterestingly, while not citing
I(eeton, the court then discussed
unconscionabitity, the basis of
I(eeton's theory of reasonable expec-
tations, saying:
\X/'hjle we decide this case on
the basis of the ambiguity in
the policy language, we are not
unmindful of the insureds'
afguments that these contfacts
àre contra,cts of adhesion; that
full coverage for damages suf-
fered by Íarrtily members is not
available on the open insur-
ance market, and that to arbi-
trariþ preclude full coverage
for family members, as op-
posed to all other persons, is
unconscionable and void as a
mattet of public policy, and
therefore, unenforceable, re-
gardless of the future clarity
of such an exclusion.
The court concluded that the
record was insuffìcient to evaluate
the policies there for unconscionabil-
ity but allowed that it could be a
factor in any future consideration
of the validity of the provision.
While the court found ambigurty,
the decision impJicitly supports the
proposition that reasonable expecta-
tions is a stand-alone doctrine by
which a provision can be voided.
The court in State Farrn Mut Auto.
In¡. Co. u. Gibson,ls Q007) applied the
reasonable expectations doctrine to
void an "owned vehicle exclusion"
that State Farm drafted in to its Medi-
calPay coverage. The exclusion, which
acted as an anti-stacking provision,
had been previously held valid in
Lierboe u. State Farrnl6 (2003).
In Gibson, the plaintiffs had paid
three separate premiums for Médical
Pay coverage on three autos and
sought to stack the coverage. As in
L;ierboe u. State Farn Q003), the in-
surer refused to stack coverage citing
the "owned-vehicle exclusion" which
provided there was no Medical Pay
coverage for any owned auto except
the "occupied" auto. The Gibsons
argued the exclusion was invalid as
against public policy. They apparently
made no claim that the provision was
ambiguous, and the court confÍmed
that by stating that, absent ambiguity,
a provision will be enforced, and the
only exception is if the contract vio-
lates public policy.
Because the Gibsons had paid
the separate premiums and were the
insuteds under all three policies,
which facts distinguished Cibson fuom
Lierboe, the court found that the
Gibsons had "every expectation of
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receiving" the coverage sought and
that the exclusion defeated coverage
for which valuable consideration had
been paid. Consequently, the court
voided the owned- vehicle exclusion
in the Med Pay coverage as against
public poJicy insofar as it acted as an
anti-stacking.provision. Cibson is one
of the clearer cases where the coutt
has used the doctrine of reasonable
expectations absent ambiguity to void
an insurance provision.
Hardl u. Progressiue Special4t Ins.
Co.,n Q003) involved the same basic
issues as the 1986 federal Osborn case
that wül be discussed later. ,\s in
Osborn, the policy defined an
underinsured motor vehicle as one
with BI limits less than the insured's
UIM limit and coupled the UIM
coverage v¡ith a provision that offset
anyBI coverage received from the
tortfeasot agatnst the UIM benefit
due. The result was that there wâs no
situation in which the insured could
ever recoYer the $50,000 UIM shown
on the declarations page.
The court n Harþ lumped the
public policy issues together, saying
"[w]e conclude that the offset provi-
sion, as well as the definition of
underinsured motorist, violate
Montana pubJic poJicy because they
create an ambþity regarding cover-
age, render coverage that Ptogressive
promised to provide illusory, and
defeat the insuted's reasonable expec-
taion." The case cited and likeþ fol-
lowed Osborn but does not shed much
Jight on the law of teasonable expecta-
tions except for its indication that
defeating the insured's reasonable
expectations violates public policy and
is a ground for voiding the provision.
The above Line of cases estab-
lishes that orìe carl void an insurance
provision for violating the insuted's
reasonable expectations and regard-
less of whether the provision is
ambiguous. The problem is that
Montana courts have occasionally
insisted that Montana requires
ambiguity as a prerequisite to any
reasonable expectalions inquiry.
Federal cases requiring ambiguity
before applyrng the reasonable
expectâtions doctrine
In contrast, Montana federal
courts began their anaþsis of the
reasonable expectations doctrine via
traditional contract law interpreta-
tion; where the presence of ambigu-
ity is the threshold issue. In 1986,
Federal District Judge Lovell voided
provisions of Transamerica Insur-
ance Company's auto policy in
Transamerica Insøraruce Groap u. Osborn.l8
There, the insurer issued a declara-
tions page promising $50,000 of
Underinsured Motorist coverage.
Flowevet, the policy defìned an
underinsured motor vehicle âs one
with BI limits less than the insured's
UIM limit and coupled the UIM with
a provision that offset any BI cover-
age received from the tortfeasor
against the UIM benefit due. The
import of the provisions was that,
under no circumstances could the
insuted ever teceive more than
$25,000 UIM coverage. (fhis was the
sarhe fact scenario of LIarþ (2003)
discussed above.)
Consequently, Judge Lovell
found the UIM defìnition "ambþ-
ous and inconsistent with the limits
of Jiability expressed on the Declara-
tions Page" and described it as "an
inherent ambiguity in the policy
which cannot be reconciled." The
court held the offending vehicle to
be underinsured though its BI policy
limits exceeded the UIM limit of
Osborn's poJicy and held the policy
definition of underinsured motor
vehicle void as against pubJic potcy
of the State of Montana, saying of
that public policy:
These recent decisions indicate
the policy behind the laws of
Montana with respect to insur-
ance. The underþing theme is
the protection of the reasorl-
able expectations of he in-
sured at the time the policy
was putchased.
The court 'tn O¡born clearþ found
ambþity and just as clearþ voided
the offending provision for violating
the reasonable expectations of the
insuted.
Similarly, in lWellcome u. Home Ins.
Co. (1,991),1e a trial court imposed a
sanction ofl attorney Page NØellcome
and the insurer he represented for
violations of the court's orders re-
garding conduct of uoir dire, exam)na-
tion of witnesses, and argument.
Wellcome's errors and omissions
catrter, Home Insurance Company,
refused to pay the sanctions citing its
policy exclusion for payment of
"fìres or statutory penalties whether
imposed by law oï otherwise. . . "
In a fedetal action against Home
Insurance Company, W'ellcome
sought summary judgment on the
grounds (1) that the term "fine" was
ambiguous and, Q) that coverage
should be required under the reason-
able expectations doctrine. fnstead,
the Federal Coutt granted summary
judgment to Home fnsurance Com-
pany finding that the exclusion was
unambiguous clearþ excluding pay-
ments for money ordered paid by a
trial coutt fot misconduct.
Judge Hatfìeld discussed
\)Øellcome's invocation of the reason-
able expectations doctrine noting that
it was recognized in Montana and
itttng Transamerica u. Ro1/e. However,
he said of the doctdne that "its pre-
cise dimensions have never been
refìned," and asserted that "it has
been utilized in other jurisdictions
to resolve ambiguities in insurance
PecB 36 Tnr¡r TneNos - SuuuBn 2008
policies in ordet that the policies
comport v¡ith the insured's reasonable
expectat-ions," He then went on to say:
The rationale upon which the
doctdne is based is in accord
with Montana's strong public
policy of protecting insureds
from seeing insurance cover-
age defeated by an insurer's
use of confusing or ambigr,r-
ous policy language. Sæ, Rodlì
u. Anerican Barukers Ins. Co. Of
Florida, 44 Mont.St.Rprtr. 1 888
(D. Mont. 1987).
Hatfield said that the idea that
the doctrine applied to all coverage
disputes regardless of the presence
of ambiguity was a minority view and
concluded from the Transamerica u.
Ro1le case that Montana would follow
the majority view, i.e., that the doc-
trine is only used to resolve ambþ-
ity. It is diffìcult to see how he
reached such a conclusion based on
anything the Montana Supteme Court
said in Transamerica u. Roje which
involved no ambiguity and voided a
family exclusion for violating the
insured's reasonable expectations.
Hatfìeld concluded that Wellcome
"may not rely upon the doctrine to
create coverage which, by the clear
terms of the policy, did not exist."
Hatfìeld's decision, which was
appealed, is a classic example of
cases requiring ambigurty before the
doctrine can be applied. In other
words, the doctrine's only use would
be to resolve ambþities. ìØhen the
decision was appealed to the Ninth
Circuit, that court certifìed the issues
to the Montana Supteme Court,
which approached the reasonable
expectations issue differently as will
be discussed below.
Judge Hatfield had also previ-
ously found ambiguity and then
applied the reasonable expectations
doctrine to void an "ofher insurance"
clause which acted as an anti-stacking
provision in BenneÍt u. State Farm Mat.
Aøto. Ins. C0.20 (Ironically, Hatfield's
decision was also appealed to the
Ninth Circuit and certified from there
to the Montana Supreme Court.)
After fìnding the clause ambiguous,
Hatfield reasoned that voiding the
clause comported with the insured's
reasonable expectations.2l ÏØhen that
decision was appealed to the Ninth
Circuit, it certifìed to the Montana
Supreme Court the question whether
an "othef insufance" clause that
prohibits stacking of underinsured
motorist coveÍage provided by sepa-
rate policies from the same insurer is
void as against public poJicy?
\)Øhile the Montana Supreme
Court appeared to be pursuing a
I(eetonesque poJicy of voiding insur-
ance provisions soleþ for violating an
insured's reasonable expectations,
Federal Judge Hatfield persisted in
his apparent belief that Montana law
required ambiguity. He did so even
though appeals of his decisions were
going to the Ninth Circuit which was
certifying the questions to the Mon-
tana Supteme Court which was not
requiring ambiguity to trþger the
reasonable expectations doctrine.
In September of 1.994, in Sltook u.
State Farnu Mat. Aata Ins. Co. of
Bloomington,2z Judge Hatfìeld was
confronted with another auto acit-
dent case in which the question was
whether a "modified" famly exclu-
sion was invalid either as a mattet of
public policy or because it violated
the insured's reasonable expectations.
There, the passenger wife sued her
driver husband for negligence result-
ing in her injury. State Farm's "modi-
fìed household exclusion" provided
that there was no coverage for bodily
injury to a farrnly member "to the
extent the limits of JiabiJity of this
policy exceed the limits of liabiJity
tequired by law." By excluding cover-
age only for the amounts in excess of
the minimum limits required by law,
the insurer hoped to avoid having the
clause declated invalid as against
public policy for not meeting the
minimum coverage requirements of
the Mandatory Liability Law, MCA
S 61-6-301 and the Motor Vehicle
Financial Responsibility Act, MCÂ
$ 61,-6-1,03 et. seq.
In Shook, Judge Hatfìeld, held
that "an exclusionary endorsement
which operates to limit coverage to
the statBtory minimum amounts
established by MCA $ 61-ó-301 is not
violative of the public policy inherent
in Montana's mandatory insurance
law" He then addressed whether the
modified exclusion was invalid under
the doctrine of reasonable expecta-
tions which he said, "recognizes an
insured is entitled to fully expect the
coverage provided by a policy will be
consistent with the language of the
policy as understood by the average
consumer." Hatfield cited Ro-yle and
lYellcome and then said:
Stated another way, the insured
has the right to make an in-
formed decision regarding the
security he will purchase for
himself and his farntly, and an
insurance company, granted
the privilege to market its
product in the State of Mon-
tana, will not be allowed to
vitiate that right through the
utilzation of a policy that cre-
ates ambþity regarding the
coverage afforded.
Judge Hatfìeld asserted that Ro/e
"acknowledged the vitality of the
'reasonable expectations' docttine"
but never undertook to defìne its
precise dimensions." He stated that
applylng the doctrine to all questions
of insurance coverage regardless of
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ambiguities was the minority view of
a limited number of jurisdictions
while the majority utilzed the doc-
trine to resolve ambiguities. Next, he
set forth several tenets of the law of
ambiguity:
fÂ]mbiguity does not exist
because a claimant says so. It
can only exist where the word-
ing or phraseology of the con-
tract is reasonably subject to
rwo different i nterpretations.
**>k
ff]he determination of
whethet an ambiguity exists in
an insurance poJicy requires an
examination of the language
utilized from the viewpoint of
a consumer of average intelli-
gence, not trained in the law or
in the insurance business.
The determination of whether
the expectations of the put-
chaser of an insurance policy
are objectively reasonable must
begin with an assessment of
the nature of the security
which a reasonably ptudent
layman would understand that
the policy is generally desþed
to provide.
***
The language employed in the
policy must then be reviewed,
in Jight of the policy's purpose,
to determine whether the lan-
guage is clear and subject to
only one meaning or whether,
from the perspective of the
insured, the language is subject
l".tt*rtn* 
interpretation s.
If the language is capable of
more than one constfuction,
an ambiguity exists which
must be construed against the
insurer.
***
fFl]owevet, if the language
employed in an insurance con-
tr^ct, 
^nd 
more particularly, an
exclusion, is clear and unam-
biguous, the language controls,
and an expectation which is
contrary to the language is not
"objectively reasonable."
Judge Hatfìeld found the modi-
fìed household exclusion capable of
more than one corlstruction and
therefore ambþous. Ultimately
Hatfield held:
In view of the emasculating
effect the "household exclu-
sion" has upon the securiry
provided by a liabüity policy,
the reasonable consumer
would legitimately expect a
caveat of that magnitude to
be strategically located. The
obscure positioning of the
exclusion v¡ould lead a reason-
able consumer to interpret the
language of the exclusion in
the most reasonably limited
mannef.
Judge Hatfìeld deirded Shook
consistently with his view that the
rightful role of reasonable expecta-
tions is as a temedy when dealing
with contracrual ambiguity.
Âs an aside, the author notes
that, in doingso,Judge Hatfìeld cuti-
ously claimed not to be persuaded by
any argument of "structural ambþ-
ity" while agreeing thar "the position-
ing of the exclusion, in relation to the
general coverage provision, lends
itself to the creation of the ambiguity
in the exclusion." He added, "How-
ever, given the inclisputable impor-
tance of the household exclusion to
the average coflsumef, the stfuctufe
of the policy takes on added signifì-
cance," and also said, "The poìicy,
however, separates the 'household
exclusion'both in time and in space
and relation to this broad proclama-
tion of JiabiJity'covetage."
Federal Magistrate Judge Rich
Anderson found ambiguity and then
resolved it with the reasonable expec-
tations doctrine in Progrusiue Casøalry
Insarance Companj u. Owen,23 (2006).
There, he was confronted with the
problem caused when the insurer
makes a closely held corporation
the only named insured on an auto
policy that provides coverage for
bodily injury. Arlene Owen was a vice
president, secretary and rìirector of
a corporation in which she and her
husband were the only shareholders.
She suffered severe injury when
loading hay bales on a semi she was
driving that didn't belong to the cor-
poration. The company refused het
demand for UIM benefits on the
ground that the cotporation was the
only named insured.
Judge Anderson recited the prin-
cþle that, "If ambþity exists, the
covrt m^y consider the reasonable
expectations of the insured." Ander-
son found that "Simply put, it is
impossible to read and understand
this policy by examining individual
coverages," and concluded that the
only way to make sense of it was "to
add human named insureds as to
those coverages that, by their very
Írar)re, can only apply to humans."
Ultimately, he held that Arlene
Owens, in her positions with the
corporalion could reasonably have
expected that she would be covered
for UIM and medical bene{ìts under
Progressive's policy with the corpora-
tion. The case is a classic application
of the school of thought that one
must fìnd ambþity after which the
reasonable expectations of the in-
suted can be consideted in determin-
ing the meaning of the poJicy.
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lAn aberrant decision of the
Montana Supreme Court requiring
ambiguity
Ârguably, as the result of the
large numbet of federal cases where
the court only applied teasonable
expectations with the presence of
contractual ambþity, the Montana
Supreme Court began to file similat
case decisions. For the fitst time, in
1998, the Montana Supreme Court in
Coønterþoint, Inc. u. Essex Ins. Co.2a
declined to apply the reasonable ex-
pectations doctrine while using lan-
guage indicating it would only do so
after finding ambiguity. There, the
court upheld an exclusion for claims
arising out of termination of employ-
ment where the operator of a non-
profit group home was sued for
wrongful dischatge. The coutt te-
fused to consider reasonable expecta-
tions or apply rules for interpreting
adhesion contracts because it con-
cluded the provision was unambþ-
ous and enforceable as written. The
court said:
This Court has said that
"[e]xpectations which are con-
trary to a clear exclusion ftom
covefâge afe not'objectively
reasonable."' (Citing lYelhome
and Statqnaø) Furthermore, we
consider special rules of inter-
preting contracts only when a
contract is ambþous. (Citing
Statlnan) Even though we
have previously tecognized an
exception to enforcing an un-
ambiguous insurance contract
term when the term violates
publìc policy, this exception is
not before us. (Citing Aøgøstine
u. Sirnonson (1,991))'zs
The court's statement wâs re-
markable in light of the line of cases
in which it had been applyrng the
doctrine absent ambþity since Ro1le
in 1.979. Furthermore, the assertion
that the court would only consider
the doctrine if it found ambigurty
first was contradicted two months
later when the court decided American
Famiþ møt. In¡. Co. u. Liuengood 26 1L6
(1997) in December 1998.
In L;iuengood, Henninger negli-
gently injurecl Livengoods whìle
driving a van belonging to her room-
mate, Frehse. Henninger's personal
auto and Frehse's van were both
insuted under separate poJicies by
American which defended and paid
the loss under Frehse's policy since
Henninger wâs an insured by reason
of het petmissive use. The company
refused to pay under the Bodily In-
jury coverage of Henninger's policy
because of its "non-owned auto
exclusion" that excluded coverage for
"bodily injury or property damage
adsing out of the use of a vehicle,
other than your insured car, which is
owned by or funished ot available
fot tegular use by you or any tesident
of your household."
The District Court granted sum-
mary judgment to Ämerican, and the
Livengoods raised three issues at the
Montana Supreme Court: (1) whether
the exclusion applied, (2) whether it
violated Montana public poJicy, and
(3) whether it violated the reasonable
expectations of the insured. After
holding that the exclusion applied
and was not violative of public
policy, the court disposed of the
reasonable expectations doctdne
argument just as it did in Søtrynan
saying "the reasonable expectations
doctrine is inapplicable where the
terms of the poJicy at issue clearþ
demonsttate an intent to exclude
coverage." (Citing IYellnne) The rea-
son, of course, is that '[e]xpectations
which are contrary to a clear exclu-
sion from coverage are not 'objec-
tively reason able."' (citing ll/e llnn e)
Again, the court considered the
separate argument that the provision
was invalid by teason of violation of
the reasonable expectations of the
insured, the impJication being that a
provision can be voided on that basis
alone. In neither Støtryzan nor
L;iuengood did the court say that it
could not or would not consider the
doctrine without an underþing ambi-
gulty in the policy. However, propo-
nents of the ambiguity requirement
could argue that statement was im-
plicit in the court's assertio'n of a
"clear exclusion from covefage."
Cases in which clear exclusions
from coverage are deemed to
defeat the insured's reasonable
expectations
A) Montana Supreme Court
Decisions
The Montana Supreme Court has
issued a line of decisions in each of
which the court appears to make a
reasonable expectations inquiry but
concludes that the insured's expecta-
tion of coverage cannot be reason-
able in the face of a clear exclusion
from coverage. The question is
whether the coutt in those cases is
applyrng the reasonable expectations
doctrine by making the inquiry absent
ambiguity, or whethet the cases stand
for the proposition that where there
is no ambiguity, the reasonable expec-
tations doctrine does not apply. The
court appears to be applying the
doctrine to conclude that the expecta-
tion is not reasonable given a clear
exclusion from coverage. If sq the
cases further reflect that the court is
following I(eeton,
In the eadiest instance, attorney
\ü/ellcome appealed to the Ninth
Circuit Judge Hatfìeld's decision in
his case against Home Insutance
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Company (discussed above). The
Ninth Citcuit, in turn, certified to the
Montana Supteme Coutt the ques-
tions (1) whether ambiguity in the
contfact required Home to cover the
sanctions, and Q) whether the doc-
trine of reasonable expectations re-
quired Home to do so27. Notably, the
Ninth Circuit certifìed ambiguity and
reasonable expectations as two sepa-
rate issues in a case in which trial
court judge Hatfìeld had posited that
reasonable expectations could not
exist absent ambiguity.
On certifìcation, the Montana
Supteme Court held that the policy's
exclusion of coverage for sancLions
was flot ambþous. At that point, it
could have said that the issue of rca-
sonable expectations was moot, there
being no ambiguity. Instead, the court
concluded that the doctrine of teason-
able expectations did not require cov-
eragein the case saying: "Expectations
which are corfirary to a cleat exclusion
from coverage âre not'objectiveþ
reasonable' as we used that term in
Ro1le." The court said, "fn neither
Rolle nor Brawn dtd we apply the doc-
ffine to require colrerâge where the
cleat policy language excluded the
coverage" (an assertion that is not
tfue, since, tnRo/e, the coutt did re-
quire Bodily Injury coverâge where the
household exclusion cleatþ excepted
it.) Nevertheless, the court appeared to
apply the doctdne to find that the
expectation was not reasonable.
Sq what was the basis of
ll/elhome? The court appeared to apply
the reasonable expectations doctrine
and found that the expectation was
not reasonable in the face of a clear
exclusion from coverage. Did the
couft consider the exclusion from
coverage clear because rùTellcome was
alawyer? Or, was it (as an 4mbigutty
proponent might argue) because one
can only consider reasonable expecta-
tions in the face of an unclear (am-
bþous), exclusion from coverage?
At any rate, the case was the ftst of a
line of reasonable expectations cases
in which the coutts found no ambi-
guity, made the reasonable expecta-
tions inquiry, and then determined
that the insuted had no reasonable
expectation in the face of a clear
exclusion from coverage.
In Støtlman u. Safeco Ins. Co. of
America,2s in 1997, the wife who was
injured in an auto driven by her hus-
band recovered the Bodily Injury @f
limit of $100,000 from their auto
policy and then asserted a clnm to
the Underinsured Motorist coverage
limit of $100,000. Safeco refused on
the ground that the UIM coverage
contained an "owned auto exclusion"
effectively denying coverage if the
person was injured in an auto owned
by a relative. The coutt tejected argu-
ments that there was any ambiguity as
to whether a spouse wàs a "telative,"
and also held the exclusionary clause
did not violate public policy because
there is no statutory requirement for
UIM coverage in Montana.
The Støtrynan court then
addressed the doctrine under its
heading "8. Reasonable Expectations
Docftine," important to our discus-
sion because the court had alteady
found the owned auto exclusion was
not ambiguous. The insured's conten-
tion was that the provision was void
for violation of her reasonable expec-
tations. The court summarily rejected
that atgument on the ground that
"the reasonable expectations doctrine
is inapplicable where, as we have
found here, the terms of the insur-
ance policy clearþ demonstrate an
intent to exclude coverage. (Citing
IVe lhorn e) Rather,' lel xpectations
which are contrary to a clear exclu-
sion from coverage are not'objec-
tively reason able."' (Citing lVe llnme)
Arguably, the statement is a princþle
by which one tesolves the issue of
whether a ptovision is void by reason
of the insured's reasonable expecta-
tions. However, proponents of the
theory that ambiguity is a precondi-
tion to consideration of the reason-
able expectations doctine could argue
that only in the face of an unclear
(i.e., ambþous) exclusion can one
consider reasonable expectations.
In the 2000 case of Babcock u.
Farmers lrus. Exchange,2e Babcock was
tov/ing a borrowed horse trailer that
broke loose from her pickup truck
and crashed into a fence. Her insurer
paid the $500 collision coverage but
refused to pay the $4,500 loss to the
trailer under the liability coverage
because of exclusions to coverage fot
property owned or transported by the
insured or rented or in the charge of
the insured. The court found the
plain and ordinary language of the
exclusions defeated coverage and
then discussed reasonable expecta-
tions at the end of the decision,
asserting that "The doctrine of rea-
sonable expectations does not apply
to cfeate coverage where 'the terms
of the insurance policy clearly dem-
onstrate an intent to exclude [r".h]
coverage," (Citing Statlnan) The
court found the liabiJity exclusions
"ate trot ambþous on their own
terms nor atie they ambiguous in Jight
of Babcock's policy as a whole.
Babcock's policy cleatly demonstrates
an intent to exclude liability coverage
for the damage to the borrowed
horsetrailer..."
The court in l-,terboe u. State Farm
Mat. Aato. Ins. Co.,3o in 2003, en-
forced State Farm's "rìo coverage"
provision in its Medical Pay coverage
which provision contained an exclu-
sion for injury sustained while occu-
pying an owned auto "not insured
undet this covefage." Hence, the
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exclusion ümited the insured's Med
Pay coverage to that on the auto in
which she was riding, in effect acting
as an anti-stacking provision. The
court found the exclusion "clear and
unambþous" and rejected Lierboe's
reasonable expectations argument on
the ground that "[e]xpectations which
are contrary to a clear exclusion from
coverage are not objectively reason-
able." (Citing Søtqnan and IYellcone)
The court said there was no coverage
on any vehicle not occupied, so thete
was r1o stacking issue. It also said that
I-ierboe had no reasonable expecta-
tion of coveÍage under the second
policy, because she did not quali$/ as
an insured undet more than one Med
Pay coverage. Again, the inquiry
appears to have been whether the
provision was void for violating rea-
sonable expectations, not whether
reasonable expectations could resolve
an ambiguity.
In Cenera/i-U.5. Branch u.
Alexønder,3l73 P.3d 800. (2004) the
court seemed to recognize the ftne
line between ruling the reasonable
expectations doctrine inapplicable in
the face of a clear exclusion and
fìnding the jnsured's expectations
unreasonable in the face of a clear
exclusion:
NØe have held that "[e]xpecta-
tions that ùre contrary to a
cleat exclusion from coverage
are not 'objectiveþ reasonable,'
although the "reasonable ex-
pectations docttine" does not
apply in situations "where
clear policy language excluded
the coverage."
In Hanuilton u. Triniry Uniuersal Ins.
C0.32 Q006), the Montana Supreme
Court upheld an "owned vehicle"
exclusion where it was alleged to
violate reasonable expectations of the
insured. There, ZackH.amJlton, age
23, was injuted whle driving his
uninsured Toyota pickup truck. He
lived with his parents who insured
three vehicles with Trinity under
poJicies providing UIM coverage.
,\fter settling for the tortfeasor's BI
limits, he claimed the UIM benefits
under his parents'policies, and Trin-
ity refused on the basis of the ownecl
vehicle exclusion.
The Hamiltons claimed the ex-
clusion should be invalidated as con-
trary to their reasonable expectations.
The court specifìcaþ noted that they
\¡r''ere not claiming it was ambþous
but complained instead that a person
had to look to several places in the
policy to determine whether coverage
was provided. The court refused the
argument of invalidity on the twin
grounds that (1) the reasonable ex-
pectations doctrine is ìnapplicable in
the face of a clear exclusion from
liability, expectations corttrzLry to 
^
clear exclusion are not objectiveþ
reasonable, nnd Q) "it is not objec-
tiveþ reasonable for an insured to
expect to receive underinsured mo-
torist coverage for a vehicle fot which
he or she has not purchased any avTo-
mobile insurance."
Finally, in Newbør1 u. State Farm
Fire dv Cal Ins. Co. of Bloomirugton,
il1.,33 State Farm's Medical Pay cover-
age had an exclusion from coverage
"to the extent workers compensation
benefìts are required to be payable."
Newbury was injured in a work re-
lated vehicle/pedestrian accident.
State Farm refused to p^y his $17,230
in medicals on the grounds that work
comp had paid them so that they
were clearþ excluded.
The Montana Supreme Court
found the exclusion unambiguous
and clearly demonstrated an intent to
exclude coverage so that the require-
ments of the reasonable expectations
doctrine could not be met. Notably,
the court tteated reasonable expecta-
tions as à separàte issue after it had
already held that the exclusion was
unambþous. Once again, the court
could have said it could not consider
the doctrine if there was no ambþ-
ity. Instead, it said that "expectations
that are contrary to a clear exclusion
fiom coverage are not objectively
reasonable."
B) Fedetal Court Decisions
A strong fedetal court decision
byJudge Molloy, Han¡on u. Emþloyrs
Matual Casaa/ry Co.,3a is consistent
v¡ith the holdings of the Montana
Supreme Court. The case involved
the frustrating situation where the
insurer of a closeþ held family cor-
poration issues a policy providing
coverages for "bodily injury'' but
makes the cotporation, which cannot
suffer "bodily injury" the named
insured. In Hager u. American IYest
Insør. C0.,35 Judge Hatfield in 1989
held, "\Øhete an automobile liability
policy containing the 'family member'
terminology has been issued to a
closely held corporation, it is entireþ
legiumate to conclude the readily
identifiable offìcers and shateholders
of that corporate entity fall within the
purview of that terminology."
Hanson, who was injured as a
pedestrian by an underinsured motor-
ist was a principal in a famtly closely
held corporation. To the insurer's
assertion that he was not an insured,
Hanson argued that coverages apply-
ing only to "bodily injury'' cannot be
suffered by a corpotation, so that a
reasonable consumer would have a
teasonable expectation that the cover-
age would apply to the family mem-
bers or officers involved in the
cotporation.
NØithout fìnding any ambiguity,
Judge Molloy applied the teasonable
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expectations doctrine but found that,
because Hanson was a pedestrian,
and the policy only provided UM/
UIM to other than named insureds if
they were occupying an insured ve-
hicle, Hanson could have no reason-
âble expectation of coverage. In fact,
Molloy said "Thus, the clear language
of the insurance contract rebuts
Plaintiffs' reasonable expectations
argument, which is not saved by
resort to policy arguments." (Ihe
court found for plaintiff, however,
on other grounds.) This was a case
in which, finding no ambiguity, the
judge made a reasonable expectations
inquiry and determined that there
was no ground for the insured's
expectation that the poJicy would
provide UIM coverage to pedestrians.
Hovrever, the case allows reasonable
expectations inquity without any
ambiguity.
Conclusion
Analyzng reasonable expecta-
tions cases in Montana reveals that
typically t'teasonable expectations" is
the last issue discussed in court deci-
sions. This may be because counsel
advocates the doctrine last in briefs,
perhaps teflecting a lack of certainty
about the doctrine's effectiveness.
The confusion engendered because
the federal courts' require ambþity
while the Montana Supreme Coutt
does not, makes for inconsistency,
lack of claÅty, and absence of
assuredness for counsel.
Counsel need to keep clarity
about the reasonable expectations
doctdne by presenting the doctrine's
base in unconscionabiJity and not
ambiguity. Insurance policies are
contracts of adhesion. Hence, it is
imperative that coufts assess the
nature of the secutity which a reason-
ably prudent layman would under-
stand the policy is generally desþed
to provide and act to protect that
expectation in the face of technical
language that defeats it. To achieve
an equitable result, the court needs to
watch for unconscionable advantage
and give up the search for ambiguity
which only yields tortured and unpre-
dictable decisions. To achieve this
change, advocates must have a cLear
understanding of the reasonable
expectations doctrine and recognize
its importance and utility. The Mon-
tana Supreme Court in Counterþoint,
Inc. u. Essex Ins. Ca (1998) muddled
the doctdne when it indicated the
belief that it had been requiring
ambigurty even though a line of
decisions issued since 1979 said
otherwise. The federal courts, which
are supposed to be applying Montana
law, appear oblivious to the Montana
Supteme Court decisions on the
doctrine.
If "reasonable expectations" did
not apply absent ambiguity, what
would stop an insurer fiom drafting
clear but heinous exclusions to op-
tional coverages like UIM and Med
Pay? Public policy protects the man-
d^toty coverages of BI and UM,
because an exclusion must not in-
fringe the coverage required by stat-
ute. But, the public policy protectìng
UIM and Med Pay is the doctrine of
reasonable expectations of the in-
sured as set out by Professor l(eeton
and by the Montana Supreme Court
'tn Tran¡america u. Rofle in 1979.
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